

Evaluating the Transatlantic Relationship

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By

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Introduction

It is no secret that in the build-up to the invasion of Iraq, the cracks in the transatlantic relationship were critically exposed, with France openly campaigning the UN for a “non” on a security resolution over Iraq, massive anti-US demonstrations on February 15, 2003 around the world, and exchanging of harsh words between the US and European leaders in the media. This crisis ignited a hot debate in the press, among academics and foreign policy elites over who and what was to blame for this split. Assigning blame however does not answer the question of what is the state of the transatlantic relationship. It simply assumes that the relationship is broken. Assessing the transatlantic relationship is much more complicated than merely assigning blame because the relationship is so complex.

The world has changed since the end of the Cold War, when the transatlantic alliance as we know it was forged. There are new security threats facing the United States and Europe. North Korea and Iran are developing nuclear technologies and Islamist fundamentalism is spreading, breeding international terrorism. The world markets are opening as the phenomenon of globalization expands. The Indian and Chinese economies are steadily growing, as China and India become global players. Europe has integrated more deeply, with most member states of the European Union using a single currency. It has also expanded to include 25 member states. The meaning of being European is changing. The United States no longer seeks to contain its threats; instead it chooses a policy of preemption. Because of the new shape of the world, the transatlantic relationship needs to be completely reevaluated in the context of these changes.

The transatlantic relationship is a historical relationship, an economic relationship and a security relationship—if one thinks of the transatlantic relationship as a stool, these are the three legs. To develop a clear picture of the state of the transatlantic relationship, to have a

meaningful debate over what has happened to the transatlantic relationship, the three legs need to be examined to see if the transatlantic alliance is still intact and how it works today.

This paper shall show the transatlantic relationship has three facets: historical, economic and security and that before a grand debate takes place over the “end of the relationship,” a systematic reevaluation of the three facets needs to be conducted to measure the state of the transatlantic relationship. To do this, I shall first trace the history of the transatlantic relationship and the evolving historical, economic and security ties. I shall then show the debate surrounding the transatlantic relationship as it stands today to show what scholars are writing about the transatlantic relationship. I argue that before scholars talk about the end of the transatlantic relationship, the state of the transatlantic relationship needs to be measured. I will give an example of the systematic reevaluation I believe to be necessary by examining the security aspect of the relationship. I will show that the security facet of the relationship, while operational, is weakened in the current global climate. I will point to future analysis that should take place and draw some broader conclusions about the transatlantic relationship and the debate surrounding it.

To show the evolution of the transatlantic relationship, I shall use historical sources, both primary and secondary. To show the debate surrounding the transatlantic relationship, I shall use a sample of books and articles written by scholars to show the spectrum of the debate. To measure the state of the transatlantic relationship security alliance, I will examine the operational coordination between the United States and Europe, the philosophical understanding of threats the United States and Europe hold and the respect each side holds for one another. I use statements from leaders and public opinion polls for evidence. Decisions in foreign policy are made at the top by the leaders. They are influenced by other political players including military

leaders, businesses, and special-interest groups, to name a few, but ultimately the leaders make the final decisions. I have chosen to include public opinion polls for evidence as well because in democracies, the public holds their leaders accountable for their actions. The public's view on the transatlantic relationship can hold powerful checks on the leadership in democracies and even determine the make-up of their leadership. I also use newspaper articles for examples of the operational cooperation between countries.

The Historical Evolution of the Transatlantic Relationship

The relationship between the US and Europe has gone through many transformations and is continually evolving and changing. The relationship however, has always centered on historical ties and shared values, economic connections and security. Europe and America have been connected since the colonization of the North American continent by the European powers. The United States “had been established by war at the expense of European powers such as Britain, France and Spain, and also by seizing territory from Mexico and from the Native American Indians” (Reynolds 24). After Spain financed Christopher Columbus's discovery of the New World for Europe, it illustrated that, “profits could be made in a new arena for commerce across the Atlantic. France and England tried to follow Spain's lead” (Roark et al 46). Indeed the British settled in what is now the eastern United States, the Spanish settled in what is now Mexico and the southwest United States, and the French settled in Canada. In the eighteenth century, there were settlers from England, Scotland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Germany, bringing their culture and values with them from Europe, and there were African slaves in the colonies. In the middle colonies, Germans made up the largest contingent of immigrants from the European continent with more than 100,000 Germans in the colonies in 1770 (Roark et al 109).

European countries were so attached to their territories in the colonies that France and England went to war on the North American continent in the French and Indian War. The British had to find a way to pay for this war and raised taxes on the American colonies. This caused resentment among the colonists who thought it was unfair to be taxed when they did not have a say in parliament. This ultimately led to the Revolutionary War when the American colonists declared independence from the British crown. France aided the colonies militarily in the Revolution. In 1778, the French and the confederated government signed an alliance promising aid if France became under attack (Roark et al 226).

When England and France went to war, French versus British loyalty became a “very delicate and critical” foreign policy issue as Americans were divided between loyalty to the French for their help in the Revolutionary War and strong commercial ties with the British (Roark et al 226). Ultimately the United States stayed out of the European war, but kept trading with France. Due to British displeasure with this, the United States made major concessions to the British while securing some favorable commercial agreements for the United States in the Jay Treaty (Roark et al 226). Loyalty to France or Britain became a distinction between the Republicans and Federalists, the two early political parties in the United States (Roark et al 226-7).

Indeed, the economic and military ties between the United States and Europe were evident from the settlement of Europeans in the North American continent. American security concerns with France led to the expansion of the United States with the Louisiana Purchase. Jefferson was scared by the agreement that the Spanish would cede the West to the French so he sent Livingston to buy New Orleans (Roark et al 239). Livingston came back with the Louisiana Purchase, greatly expanding American territory.

The United States stayed out of European affairs, militarily, until World War I, but its ties to Europe continued to grow as immigrants arrived from northern and western Europe. In the early 1880s, “new” immigrants from southern and eastern Europe began to arrive (Davidson et al 548). In 1900, immigrants made up 15% of the population (Davidson et al 549).

“American economic and cultural ties to the Allies, along with German submarine warfare, brought Americans into [World War I]” (Davidson et al 644). Indeed, despite President Wilson’s urge to remain impartial in thought as well as in action, true impartiality was impossible as German-Americans and Austrian-Americans tended to sympathize with the Central Powers in WWI, and most Americans, through the bonds of language, culture and history could not help but sympathize with the British; additionally, there was still a “tug of loyalty” to the French for their aid in the Revolution (Davidson et al 653). Economic ties augmented American interest in the outcome of WWI as trade between the US and the Allies grew from \$800 million to \$3 billion between 1914 and 1916 (Davidson et al 653).

In the 1920s, the United States used money power for diplomatic ends, by encouraging private bankers to cooperate in public interest to finance European financial stabilization. Foreign loans also helped lubricate US trade. By 1930, the US economy was vital to the prosperity of the world (Reynolds 28-9). Despite the economic ties to Europe, early in President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s term, US interests were not significantly touched by events in Europe or Asia (Reynolds 36). This all changed as fascism took hold in Europe.

In Roosevelt’s mind, the United States could no longer think of itself as safe because of the barrier provided by two oceans due to the advent of the air age (Reynolds 43). Because of new technologies, the US faced the possibility of European attack in the northern and southern regions of the western hemisphere (Reynolds 45). Additionally, the US was confronted with the

prospect of trying to exist in a closed world, dominated by closed fascist blocs. Indeed, it was argued that liberal capitalism could not survive in such a divided world (Leffler 30). Roosevelt routinely argued “American security was not divisible from that of the world,” and insisted “that American values could not flourish in an alien ideological environment” (Reynolds 52). His sentiments were echoed by Walter Lippman, an influential Atlanticist who argued that the United States could not tolerate a hostile sea power on the European side of the Atlantic (Reynolds 128).

Roosevelt began selling Americans on the idea that the “first line of defense in the United States” was the “continued independent existence” of Britain and France (Reynolds 48). US media began depicting Britain as tied to American values through reminders of “the transatlantic cultural heritage of language and literature, religion and law” (Reynolds 98). Public opinion began to shift, highlighting a sense of connection rather than separation between Western Europe and North America (Reynolds 127). All of this culminated in the creation of the Atlantic Charter (1941), a statement of the “common principles in the national policies” of the United Kingdom and the United States on which Churchill and Roosevelt “base their hopes for a better future for the world” (*The Atlantic Charter*). The Atlantic Charter stresses the common democratic and liberal principles of freedom of choice of government, equal access to trade and raw materials, economic advancement and social security, freedom of movement, and freedom from fear and want.

Following the victory in World War II, the United States, for its own national security, primarily wanted to ensure that no potential adversary or coalition of adversaries gained control over resources in Europe and Asia (Leffler 48). “Even the specter of such a situation would force the United States to prepare for conflict, to reconfigure its economy, to limit political freedoms and to become a garrison state” (Leffler 48). So the United States engaged in Europe

after WWII because they felt inaction would enable the Soviets to take advantage of the circumstances to their favor and threaten US national security (Leffler 57). Facing a financial crisis in 1947, the British threatened to pull out of Greece and suspend assistance to Turkey, leaving the United States alone in containing Soviet expansion (Leffler 56). The United States responded with the Truman Doctrine, offering military aid and economic assistance to Greece and Turkey and a plan to unify the three western zones of Germany, as well as the Marshall Plan extending large amounts of aid to European countries who were willing to coordinate recovery plans (Leffler 56). The world was looking to the United States to maintain peace and the United States could only achieve that by engaging in Europe.

The Europeans wanted more than an economic assurance that the United States was going to prevent Soviet expansion in Europe. They needed assurance that the United States would help “protect them against internal unrest and external pressure” (Leffler 77). To achieve this, the United States negotiated its first non-wartime military alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Davidson et al 799).

The North Atlantic Treaty speaks of developing further friendly relations between parties, to eliminate conflict in economic policies, and encourage economic collaboration between parties to the treaty. Additionally, the treaty speaks of consultation on important security matters affecting parties to the treaty. Perhaps most significantly, the treaty declares that an armed attack against one or more parties to the treaty in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and if such an attack occurs, each will assist the attacked party or parties (*North Atlantic Treaty* Art. 5). Europe and America were officially united for a common purpose, which at that time meant to contain indigenous Communism at home and Soviet power abroad (Leffler 82).

This new alliance did not go without its trials during the Cold War. The Europeans were outraged at President Kennedy's conduct during the Cuban Missile Crisis, by possibly putting the whole world in danger without consulting the Europeans. Additionally in Europe there were bouts of Euro-centricism followed by Atlanticism, but the alliance survived and NATO became the "jewel in the crown of Cold War security structures" (Bacevich 74). The alliance became more than just a military pact, President George H.W. Bush argued. Indeed, he argued that NATO had a larger purpose to "enrich our peoples, create new opportunities and fuel growth" (Bacevich 75).

The transatlantic alliance that was in place at the end of the Cold War faced an identity crisis in the new world order. Globalization became the international system that replaced the cold-war system, according to Thomas Friedman (Bacevich 38). With the end of the threat of Communism and Soviet expansion, however, there was never any talk of dismantling the alliance. Indeed, the Cold War strategy of containment yielded a number of institutions and partnerships for America, such as NATO, that survived the end of the Cold War by providing a bulwark for stability through commitment and reassurance (Ikenberry 45). NATO needed a new purpose and achieved that with eastward expansion to former Warsaw pact states including Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic (Bacevich 103). Under President Clinton, NATO converted from a defense alliance into a vehicle for projecting power out of area, which manifested itself in the campaigns in the former Yugoslavia (Bacevich 75, 103). Bacevich argues that the intervention in Bosnia was not about Bosnia alone, but also about Europe and US leadership in Europe (103). In 1999, NATO re-defined its fundamental security acts as acting as a foundation of stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, serving as a forum for consultation on security issues, deterring and defending against any threat of aggression against any NATO member

state, contributing to conflict prevention and promoting cooperation and dialogue with other countries in the Euro-Atlantic area (*NATO Transformed*).

Despite the cooperation between the United States and Europe in the post-Cold War era, there were a number of big issues that began to undercut the transatlantic trust. Cox lists the clash over what to do about Bosnia, leaving Washington elite with the impression that Europeans could not be trusted with security questions; a difference in regional priorities with Europeans focused on Europe while Americans focused on the world as a whole; and, European tendencies to favor diplomatic and economic tools while the United States favored using hard power to resolve world problems, to name a few, undercut the alliance (212-3). While these issues tested the transatlantic alliance, ultimately, the Clinton administration had the respect of Europe through his dedication to multilateralism (at least in theory), humanitarian issues and his statesmanship. Additionally, US economic openness in the era of globalization led to increased (sevenfold) US investment in Europe between 1994 and 1998, and trade between the US and the European Union rose to \$450 billion per year (Bacevich 105).

When the current Bush administration came into power in 2000, the relationship with Europe seemed to quickly take a turn for the worst when Bush began acting in an assertive unilateral manner by withdrawing from Kyoto, a treaty to control worldwide traffic in small arms, a treaty to eliminate landmines and the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention and making it clear the United States would not be a part of the International Criminal Court (Garton Ash 105). The United States was no longer committed, even in theory, to the basics of multilateralism (Cox 215). Even when the United States and Europe seemed to come together after 9/11, when it came time to plan the military campaign in Afghanistan, the United States

politely refused NATO's declaration of Article 5 and instead of relying on traditional allies, the United States began looking for coalitions to fit the mission.

The cracks in the relationship culminated in the build-up to the Iraq war. Europe divided over whether to support Bush's efforts in Iraq or not—Britain and Spain originally aligned with the United States with Germany and France on the opposite side. German Chancellor Schroeder even ran an anti-war, and what could be construed as anti-American campaign for reelection in 2002. There were massive anti-US demonstrations on February 15, 2003 around the world. Diplomacy seemed to come to an end with insults being hurled on either side of the Atlantic—for example, former German Chancellor Schroeder called Bush's foreign policy "reckless adventure" (Szabo 23). US Secretary of Defense classified France and Germany as "Old Europe." The French openly campaigned for a "non" on the security resolution over Iraq. The United States ignored the dissent of its traditional allies and with a "coalition of the willing" invaded Iraq in 2003. The security aspect of the transatlantic relationship seemed broken down during Bush's first term in office. It was this perceived breakdown of the transatlantic relationship that sparked debate among ideologues, academics and foreign policy elites over who was to blame for this breakdown.

The Debate Surrounding the Transatlantic Relationship

Robert Kagan's *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* attempts to explain the conflict between the United States and Europe by saying that Europeans are turning away from power and living a post-historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity while the United States must exercise power in an anarchic Hobbesian world (3). "It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world" (Kagan 3). Indeed because the United States and Europe

live in two different worlds, they view the world around them differently. Europeans want to build a world based on soft power because that is where its strengths are (Kagan 37). Because Europe is no longer willing to use hard power, the United States has no choice but to act unilaterally (Kagan 99). Europeans are fearful because the United States *can* go it alone (Kagan 39). Furthermore, the power of the United States and its willingness to exercise that power (hard power) constitutes a threat to Europe's new sense of mission—to live in a paradise of peace (Kagan 61). This discrepancy between America's hard power and Europe's soft power has led to the split between the two.

Noam Chomsky believes that America's reliance on hard power is not because of Europe's lack of hard power, but rather it is used in pursuit of a grand imperial strategy that is breaking the alliance apart. In Chomsky's book *Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance* quotes Donald Kennedy, *Science* magazine editor, who claims that the problems between the United States and Europe began when the Bush administration passed on multilateral engagement with the global warming problem (3). That stance "began the long continuing process of eroding its friendships in Europe," leading to "smoldering resentment" (Chomsky 3). By 2002, the United States declared its intention to maintain its hegemony through the threat or use of military force. It is a "grand imperial strategy" that is alienating traditional allies (Chomsky 11).

Chomsky largely borrows from John Ikenberry's essay in *Foreign Affairs* entitled "America's Imperial Ambition." The essay is written in response to the release of the "National Security Strategy 2002" that changes American foreign policy from a strategy of containment to preemptive and preventive use of force. The "sweeping new ideas" call for "American unilateral and preemptive, even preventive, use of force, facilitated if possible by coalitions of the

willing—but ultimately unconstrained by the rules and norms of the international community” (Ikenberry 44). This new unchecked power exercised by the United States “will usher in a more hostile international system” and runs opposite to the way the United States successfully managed world affairs (Ikenberry 49). “The secret of the United States’ long, brilliant run as the world’s leading state was its ability and willingness to exercise power within alliance and multinational frameworks” (Ikenberry 49). The United States pursuing an “imperial ambition” has alienated traditional allies, leading to a rift.

Timothy Garton Ash admits that there were political rifts between the United States and Europe in his book *Free World: America, Europe and the Surprising Future of the West*. He explains the rift by saying that when Milosevic was taken out of power, Europe was not the source of an “urgent foreign policy problem for the United States” (Garton Ash 102). Additionally, the Bush administration thought it would be easier to deal with individual countries than Europe as a whole because of a lack of a uniform European foreign policy (Garton Ash 102). Garton Ash, however, does not believe that the rift between the United States and Europe is permanent for two reasons: economics and values (the other two legs of the transatlantic relationship). Precisely at the moment when the security aspect of the transatlantic relationship was falling apart, economic interdependence grew “spectacularly” (Garton Ash 79). Half of American capital invested overseas in the 1990s went to Europe and in 2001, half the total foreign earnings of US companies came from Europe (Garton Ash 79). Conversely, European firms hold roughly two-thirds of all foreign owned assets in the US and sales by European-owned companies in the US were worth \$1.4 trillion in 2000 (Garton Ash 79). Politics and economics moved in opposite directions (Garton Ash 79). Along with economic cooperation, the United States and Europe shared what used to be called “Western values,” now called

“democratic values.” By spreading democratic values around the world, it will keep the United States and Europe unified and working together.

Stephen Szabo discusses the breakdown of the relationship between Germany and the United States in *Parting Ways: The Crisis in German-American Relations*. He outlines distrust on both sides of the Atlantic with American foreign policy decision makers wary of Germany and German foreign policy decision makers critical of America’s “reckless adventure” foreign policy. Szabo states, “Given all the changes—both domestic and international—that have occurred since 9/11, there will be some parting of ways, a tendency toward distancing rather than balancing” (153). He claims that if there is to be a new partnership, both sides of the Atlantic will require adjustments to form a real partnership made of equal partners (Szabo 153). “Ultimately, those in power in Washington and Berlin will be the ones who decide whether to recreate or destroy a relationship that has proven to be the guarantor of European stability for more than half a century” (Szabo 153).

Michael Cox’s article, “Beyond the West: Terrors in Transatlantia,” outlines the problems between the United States and Europe, in particular, the breakdown of the security alliance and its structures and international institutions. Whereas communism had brought friends together, “it looks like the new war on terrorism was driving them apart” (Cox 216). He argues due to its marginalization in the campaign in Afghanistan and Rumsfeld’s doctrine of missions determining the coalition, rather than the other way around, “NATO is rapidly becoming one of the first, and most important ‘victims of 9/11’” (Cox 216). He points out that the increasing unilateralism of the United States and its inclination to use hard power instead of soft power is also driving the alliance apart (Cox 212-3). Despite the United States and Europe attempting to heal the rifts in the relationship after the lead up to the Iraq, the two do not share a

common perspective on Israel-Palestine, how do deal with rogue-regimes, Kyoto, the International Criminal Court, international law, arms sales to China and the means to prevent Iran from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (Cox 222). The United States and Europe do not perceive of the war on terror in the same way—the United States sees it as an era-defining struggle and Europeans do not (Cox 224). If the security structures of the transatlantic alliance are doomed, unlike Garton Ash, Cox does not see redemption in values and economics. European identity and values are changing and are being defined not only in a positive notion of Europe, but also in an increasingly negative image of the United States (Cox 226). Europe will become a huge economic force—there is more European investment in the US than there is American investment in Europe—and by dismissing Europe politically, the economic relationship will also be damaged (Cox 226-7). Ultimately, Cox believes, “the transatlantic relationship as we once knew it now looks increasingly as if it belongs to another age” (227).

Each of the critiques of the breakdown between Europe and America begin with the assumption that one or more of the facets of the transatlantic relationship are broken. Whether it is the security alliance, economics, values, or all of them, the United States and Europe are growing apart. So what exactly is the state of the transatlantic relationship and why does it look the way it does today? Because there is contention about the state of each facet of the transatlantic relationship, this question warrants a systematic evaluation of each leg of the transatlantic relationship to see where the relationship is faltering and why. Furthermore, the relationship has changed forms all the time—that doesn’t necessarily indicate a split between the US and Europe. Because the world has changed so dramatically since the end of the Cold War, the transatlantic alliance should be reevaluated within the context of today’s world. A systematic evaluation involves examining the three facets of the transatlantic relationship to see how they

are working in the present day world to measure the state of the transatlantic relationship. To demonstrate how this can be done, I will evaluate the security aspect of the transatlantic relationship.

Measuring the State of the Transatlantic Alliance

Introduction

The transatlantic relationship is affected by changes in security, making the transatlantic relationship the dependent variable. To narrow the scope of security, I shall focus on the security issue that is a common, salient and imminent threat to both the United States and Europe: international terrorism. I am choosing international terrorism instead of other security issues such as dealing with rogue states because international terrorism has directly affected Europe and the United States, and combating terrorism is the centerpiece of US foreign policy.

Research begins with a question. The question in this case would be how has the struggle against international terrorism affected the state of the transatlantic security relationship? The security facet of the transatlantic relationship is the dependent variable and the struggle against international terrorism is the independent variable, while the other independent variables that affect the transatlantic relationship, values and economics are controlled. Assuming that the economic relationship and the common values between the United States and Europe have not changed, the null hypothesis is that the struggle against international terrorism has not affected the security facet of the transatlantic relationship and the security alliance remains intact. The research hypothesis is that the international struggle against terrorism has negatively affected the security facet of the transatlantic relationship, holding all other things constant.

Method

The security relationship can be measured using three components: operational cooperation, philosophical understanding, and level of respect. Operational cooperation is straightforward—is there operational cooperation between the United States and Europe? In terms of the struggle against international terrorism this means intelligence sharing, support in military action, etc. Philosophical understanding means how do the United States and Europe understand the struggle against international terrorism and what do they believe is the best way to deal with international terrorism. Respect means showing consideration for the partners in the transatlantic alliance in making decisions, and a desire to continue working within the transatlantic relationship. A healthy transatlantic security relationship involves operational cooperation, similar philosophical understanding and mutual respect for the alliance and one another. An unhealthy security relationship means that there is little operational cooperation, there are philosophical differences and there is a lack of mutual respect. Each country in the study will be studied for operational cooperation, philosophical understanding and respect.

As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, for each country I use statements from leaders and public opinion polls for evidence. I use statements from leaders because decisions in foreign policy, while influenced by other political players, are largely made at the top. I use public opinion polls for evidence because the public serves as a powerful check on the leaders in democracies. I gathered statements made by leaders from speeches they have delivered, press releases from their offices, interviews they have given and statements reported in the press. I also used newspaper articles for examples of the operational cooperation between countries. I used the Pew Global Attitudes Project poll conducted by the Pew Research Center for the public opinion data. In my analysis I give more slightly more weight to statements by leaders than to

public opinion polls, simply because it is the leaders who have the final word on decisions in foreign policy.

The Sample

Since there is no overall coherent foreign and security policy within the framework of the European Union, I shall choose four countries to represent Europe as a whole. The first country I chose was the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) have enjoyed a “special relationship” since World War II. Since Tony Blair assumed power in 1997, Blair has faced the challenge of trying to figure out how to balance the “special relationship” with developing a new relationship with Europe. Blair wanted the UK to become the “bridge across the Atlantic” (Kramer 90). The UK has been the staunchest supporter of the United States’s “War on Terrorism” in Europe and supported the invasion of Iraq. The UK has been the victim of international terrorism when the Underground system in London was bombed on July 7, 2005. Most recently a plot was discovered in Britain in which would-be terrorists planned to bomb at least 10 commercial planes flying from the UK to the US. The UK is a good measure of the transatlantic security relationship because one would expect the UK to be operationally cooperative, philosophically aligned with the US and a mutual respect to exist between the US and the UK. If that were not the case, it would be indicative of a serious problem within the relationship.

The next country I chose to study was Germany. Germany and the US have been allies since the end of World War II. “US-German relations have been a focal point of American involvement in Europe since the end of World War II,” claims the US Department of State in their “Background Note” on Germany (8). The United States pushed for the unification of the three western occupied zones of Germany after WWII and since has been committed to German

integration into Europe and to the reunification at the end of the Cold War. The United States and Germany remained close until the build up to the Iraq war when Germany took a turn away from the United States and toward France. The personal relationship between George Bush and Gerhard Schroeder was by no means cordial, but in Szabo's book on the German-American relationship, *Parting Ways*, he also shows that the German public favored a turn towards France. Angela Merkel, the new German Chancellor, states, "It is in Germany's interest ...to maintain a close transatlantic partnership" (Federal Republic of Germany 12/6/2005). Germany has been home to international terrorist cells, including the Hamburg cell where many of the 9/11 terrorists met and worked out their plans. Germany is a good example of a northern European country that is both committed to Europe but also has traditional and historical ties to the US.

I chose France as another country to represent Europe. France and the United States have been tied together since France came to the colonies assistance in the Revolutionary War, and the United States came to the defense of France in both World War I and World War II. The relationship between the United States and France since World War II, however, has been marked with confrontation, especially since the Suez Canal in 1957. Even the US Department of State's "Background Note" claims the relations between the US and France are "active and cordial" (7). France is highly Eurocentric, and is a voice independent of the United States. In the buildup to the Iraq war, France joined Russia as the main voices on the UN Security Council opposed to military intervention. France is a good measure of the transatlantic relationship because you would expect France to be operationally cooperative, but voice philosophical differences. If France is philosophically aligned with the United States and both partners display mutual respect, the relationship is exceptionally healthy.

The final European country I chose to study was Spain. Spain was ruled by a dictator, General Franco, from 1939 until 1975 when Franco died. By the end of the 1970s, Spain had transitioned into a fully functioning democracy. Spain is representative of southern Europe. If Germany and France were part of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's "Old Europe," Spain was part of the "New Europe." Spain was a staunch ally of the US-led "War on Terror" following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and Spain was also a member of the "Coalition of the Willing" following the United States into Iraq. That all came to an end when Madrid became the victim of international terrorism. With allegations of Prime Minister Aznar's government trying to blame the Madrid bombings on the ETA, and elections only three days after the bombings, Aznar's administration was removed from power as the Spain elected Zapatero as Prime Minister. Zapatero withdrew Spanish military support from Iraq and since, instead of following the US's mission to spread democracy around the world, has started forming an "Alliance of Civilizations" meant to promote mutual understanding between cultures. Spain is an example of a southern European country, and is an example of a European country that has been affected by international terrorism.

The Data

The United States: Operational Cooperation

The United States has worked with allies around the world in an effort to prevent attacks by terrorists. It claims "many nations have rallied to fight terrorism with unprecedented cooperation on law enforcement, intelligence, military and diplomatic activity" (United States: 9/2006 7). The United States has reached out for help for cooperation on law enforcement and intelligence; this can be witnessed by looking at the dozens of arrests and plots that have been disrupted due to cooperation between the United States and partners around the world. British

law enforcement in 2004 arrested an al-Qaeda operative who was suspected of providing information on American targets to al-Qaeda; Germany arrested two suspected terrorists planning attacks against US forces in Iraq; Jordanian intelligence has disrupted al-Qaeda plots, as have Pakistani, Indonesian, and Saudi intelligence and law enforcement services, to name a few (United States: 9/2006 7). The United States has trained security forces in Kuwait, Indonesia, the Philippines, Algeria, and Chad to counter terrorist threats within their own borders (United States: 9/2006 7). Additionally, the United States is increasing the size of its Special Operations Forces to support foreign internal defense, and counterterrorism operations—the budget for Special Operations Forces has increased by 107 percent to support this effort in the struggle against terrorism (United States: 9/2006 8).

The United States has also institutionalized its cooperation, in particular, the United States works with the UN Terrorist Prevention Branch (TPB), the European Union (EU) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to encourage enactment of strong counterterrorism laws and to develop common standards and procedures to reduce terrorist exploitation of international travel (United States: 9/2006, 18). Additionally, the United States has worked with the United Nations, the G-8, the OSCE and the Organization of American States (OAS), and other international organizations, to “promote the adoption and implementation of resolutions condemning terrorism, advanced efforts to prevent and suppress terrorism and terror financing, and increased training and other assistance to build states’ capacity to combat terrorism and deny terrorists safe haven” (United States: 9/2006, 14).

The United States claims that to succeed in the “War on Terrorism,” it needs the “support and concerted action of friends and allies” (United States: 3/2006 8). Indeed it recognizes that one of the challenges of continuing the fight against terrorism is keeping their partners engaged

to coordinate assistance in the struggle (United States: 9/2006 21). And while at a policing, intelligence level the United States has made an effort to be multilateral, the manner in which it cooperates with its allies has not been respectful.

Two examples of this is the dismissal of NATO and European allied involvement in Afghanistan and the recent arrests in the UK and Pakistan that disrupted the plot to bomb commercial airline jets flying from London to the US. Secretary of State Rumsfeld dismissed the requests of the French and German governments who wanted to play a significant military role in Afghanistan, saying the coalition had to fit the conflict and their involvement would get in the way (Szabo 18). CIA director George Tenet claimed the best they could do was to focus on their own internal terrorist problems (Szabo 18). This offended the Germans and the selective multilateralism the United States was pursuing was off-putting to Europeans (Szabo 18). The United States also caused a stir in the British press when it was made known that the UK was pushed into making an arrest in the airline terror plot. “US intelligence agents told their British counterparts they were ready to ‘render’ Rashid Rauf, a British citizen allegedly linked to al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and who was under surveillance in Pakistan, unless he was picked up immediately” (Doward 1). Britain wanted more time to monitor Rauf, but the United States basically bullied the UK into making an arrest. *The Observer* claims this revelation “casts new light on the nature of America’s relationship in the war on terror” (Doward 1). The United States is pursuing operational cooperation, and is achieving that at a fairly high rate, but its manner in pursuing operational cooperation can be abrasive and offensive.

The United States: Philosophical Understanding

The United States has been very transparent in what it believes the struggle against terrorism is and how to defeat it. The US views its “War on Terror” as era defining. It is the

central focus of its foreign policy. President Bush states in the forward to the National Security Strategy 2006:

America is at war. This is a wartime national security strategy required by the grave challenge we face—the rise of terrorism fueled by an aggressive ideology of hatred and murder, fully revealed to the American people on September 11, 2001. This strategy reflects our most solemn obligation: to protect the security of the American people.

The War on Terrorism is viewed by the US government as both “a battle of arms and ideas”—a fight not only against people, but also against ideology (United States: 3/2006 9). In this war the line has been drawn very clear by the US—“you are either with us or against us.”

The first phase of the War on Terror, involves using military force and “other instruments of national power” to kill or capture the terrorists, deny them safe haven, prevent access to WMDs, and cutting off sources of support (United States: 3/2006 9). The US shifted its perception of combating terrorism following 9/11 from viewing terrorism as a law enforcement problem to acting preventively and “taking the fight to the terrorists” (United States: 9/2006 1).

“The United States can no longer simply rely on deterrence to keep the terrorists at bay or defensive measures to thwart them at the last moment. The fight must be taken to the enemy, to keep them on the run.” (United States: 3/2006 8)

The United States has “taken the fight to the terrorists” in the military campaign in Afghanistan.

The United States has been working with many nations to act preventively in the fight against terrorism, as discussed above. Part of the preventive approach is not to wait for potential terrorist plots to approach the imminent stages. Instead the US will make arrests, even if the plots are more aspirational instead of inspirational. The government will bait the would-be terrorist groups with undercover agents posing as terrorists to build cases (Whoriskey 3). An example of this would be the arrests made in Miami in June 2006.

Federal authorities announced they had made charges against seven men described as a “homegrown terrorist cell” that planned to blow up Chicago’s Sears Tower and other buildings (Whoriskey A3). However, these “terrorists” never had contact with al-Qaeda, or any other terrorist group and had not acquired any explosives (Whoriskey A3). In fact the plan to blow up the Sears Tower had largely been petered out due to organizational problems (Whoriskey A3). The Police Superintendent in Chicago admitted there was never any imminent danger to the Sears Tower (Whoriskey A3). When the true nature of the plot was revealed, the government became subject to some ridicule. An editorial in *The Boston Globe* stated, “We should all be worried when something like this gets paraded as proof that the country is making great strides in the battle against domestic terrorism” (Walker B1). The government makes no excuses however standing by their commitment to act preventively (Savage A1).

Phase Two of the War on Terror—the long-term approach for the US is the advancement of freedom and human dignity through democracy as the antidote to the terrorist ideology. “The advancement of freedom and human dignity through democracy is the long-term solution to the transnational terrorism of today” (United States: 3/2006 11). The National Security Strategy claims that democracy provides a counter to the underlying causes of terrorism by replacing alienation with ownership, replacing grievances with rule of law, replacing conspiracy and misinformation with freedom of speech, and replaces an ideology that justifies murder with an ideology that offers respect for human dignity (11).

This analysis of US policy has focused on what the government says and what they do. The US public overwhelmingly supports the US-led War on Terror. As reported by the Pew Global Attitudes Project on June 13, 2006, 73 percent of Americans favor the War on Terrorism, while only 19 percent oppose.

The United States: Respect

In the last category of analysis, respect, the United States claims to have consideration for its traditional allies. In the 2005 Pew Global Attitudes Project, 67 percent of Americans are reported to believe the United States takes into account the interests of other countries around the world either a great deal or a fair amount. However, the United States planned the campaign in Afghanistan without the consideration of including its European allies, that marginalized many of them in the lead up to the Iraq War by classifying them as “Old Europe.”

Sixty-six percent of Americans in the 2005 Pew Global Attitudes Project favor a close partnership with Western Europe—up from 55 percent in 2003. Additionally, President Bush claimed on his first trip to Europe after being reelected, “America supports a strong Europe because we need a strong partner in the hard work of advancing freedom in the world,” and called for, “a new era of transatlantic unity” (Facts on File: 2/24/2005).

The United Kingdom: Operational Cooperation

The United Kingdom under Prime Minister Tony Blair has pursued a policy promoting partnership, or as he puts it engagement, not isolation. His actions are in line with his beliefs, especially on the operational front of the security alliance. “The United Kingdom is one of the United States’ closest allies, and British foreign policy emphasizes close coordination with the United States,” according to the Department of State’s Background Note on the UK (6). The United Kingdom has participated in military action in Afghanistan as part of the US-led War on Terror. They also participated in the US-led invasion of Iraq.

The United Kingdom also cooperates in policing and intelligence operations. The United States cites the example of making an arrest in 2004 of an al-Qaeda operative who provided information on American targets (United States: 9/2006 7). Recently, the United Kingdom

thwarted an airline suicide-bombing plot that targeted at least 10 commercial airline jets headed for the United States. There were a combined 40 arrests made in the UK and Pakistan in the policing and intelligence operation (Rotella A5).

The United Kingdom: Philosophical Understanding

Prime Minister Tony Blair views the struggle against international terrorism as a war, “but of a completely different kind” (8/1/2006). It is a battle against global extremism—the immediate threat coming from Islamist extremism (Blair 3/27/2006). According to Blair, the battle against international terrorism is both a military struggle, but also a struggle of ideas. “This is not just about security or military tactics. It is about hearts and minds, about inspiring people, persuading them, showing them what our values at their best stand for” (Blair 8/1/2006).

“This terrorism will not be defeated until its ideas, the poison that warps the minds of its adherents, are confronted, head-on, in their essence, at their core” (Blair 3/21/2006).

The first part of the two pronged approach—the military aspect—was already discussed above. Additionally, the UK has developed a comprehensive counterterrorism operation, due to its struggle with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) (Rotella A5). Using well-placed informants with human and high-tech surveillance, the British have become “adept at infiltrating and manipulating suspected plots in progress to reduce the dangers” (Rotella A5). For instance, in the airline plot, the investigation began almost a year ago in 2005 (Rotella A5). Peter Clarke, the head of the Metropolitan Police anti-terrorism unit said that the men who were involved in the plot had been, “subjected to extremely detailed surveillance of every aspect of their lives” (Saunders A1). The police used bugs placed in houses and cars, tapped phones and undercover spies placed inside shops the plotters visited as well as outside their homes to track the would-be bombers (Saunders A1). The surveillance and intelligence operation of the UK is marked by patience with a desire to see the full scope of alleged terrorist plots. This stands in contrast to the

US. David Omand, Britain's former security and intelligence coordinator says, "My experience with transatlantic relations is that the Americans are less inclined to risk management and want to go for safety first. That's not a criticism; it's a question of a different law enforcement culture" (Rotella A5).

The second prong of Blair's plan to battle international terrorism, the battle of ideas, manifests itself in domestic measures in the UK and foreign policy efforts. In the most recent anti-terrorism legislation passed in the UK, the government made it illegal to encourage or glorify terrorism, disseminate terrorist publications either through bookstores or the internet, prepare or plan to commit a terrorist act or to help others to do so, and give or receive training or to attend a terrorist camp (British Home Office 3/30/2006). The new legislation also widens the grounds for proscription of a terrorist group to include groups that encourage or glorify terrorism and increase the maximum penalty for a number of terrorism-related offenses (British Home Office 3/30/2006). These measures were a part of the Blair's 12-Point plan announced shortly after the July 7 terrorist attacks. In that plan, Blair also laid out his hopes to bring about a new power to order closure of a place of worship that is used as a center for fomenting extremism (Blair 8/5/2005). These steps are intended to stifle the spread of extremist ideology within the United Kingdom.

Blair argues the war against extremism can only be won "by showing that our values are stronger, better and more just, more fair than the alternative." Blair recognizes that the roots of terrorism and extremism are deep (3/21/2006). He argues the broader global agenda on poverty, climate change, trade must be revitalized and that the UK must "bend every sinew of our will" to make peace between Israel and Palestine, otherwise the battle against terrorism will not succeed (Blair 8/1/2006). Blair also points out that moderates need to be empowered to counter

extremism and offer alternative ideas. He argues that in order to empower the moderates, strong alliances need to be build, nurtured and supported in the Middle East, the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) between Israel and Palestine needs to be reenergized, the Iraq crisis needs to be resolved with Iraq emerging as a non-sectarian democratic state, and to inform Iran and Syria that they either are a part of the international community and play by the rules, or they will be confronted (Blair 8/1/2006).

Tony Blair's philosophy on combating terrorism is very aligned with that of the United States. The British public is the most supportive of the European countries studied of the US-led War on Terror, but that support has declined to 49 percent, according to the 2006 Pew Global Attitudes Project. 42 percent of Britons oppose the US-led War on Terror, the highest number since the summer of 2002.

The United Kingdom: Respect

Blair pushes the US to "always be in the lead, always at the forefront, always engaged in building alliances, in reaching out, in showing that whereas unilateral action can never be ruled out, it is not the preference" (8/1/2006). Blair preaches engagement, not isolation in foreign relations. It follows that he reaches out to the United States and pushes the United States to reach out to others. After the invasion of Iraq, Blair urged the US to rebuild European ties, saying, "Don't give up on Europe. Work with it" (Facts on File: 7/24/2003). To his European counterparts, he argues that the only way democratic development can be achieved is by building a strong alliance—an alliance that begins with America (Blair 3/27/2006). He says, "I do not always agree with the US. Sometimes they can be difficult friends to have," however, "We need them involved. We want them engaged" (Blair 3/27/2006). He goes as far as saying anti-

American feeling in parts of European politics is “madness” when set against the long-term interests of the world (Blair 3/27/2006).

His desire to continue the special relationship between the United States and Britain may be a tough sell to the British public. Only 42 percent of Britons want to remain as close to the US and 53 percent prefer a more independent approach to security and diplomatic affairs, according to the 2005 Pew Global Attitudes Project. Opinions of current US foreign policy are not high in the UK as only 32 percent of Britons believe the US takes into account the interests of the UK in their international policy decisions, according to the 2005 Pew Global Attitudes Project. In the same report, 58 percent of Britons would like to see another country become as powerful as the US. Despite the negative attitudes towards US foreign policy, Britons generally have a favorable opinion of the United States. In 2006, 56 percent of Britons had either a favorable or somewhat favorable view of the United States, according to the Pew Global Attitudes Project.

Germany: Operational Cooperation

“Germany is a close ally of the US fight against international terrorism” (Auswärtiges Amt 12/29/2005). Even though former Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder took a tough stance against the Iraq war, he too said that in the fight against international terrorism, German security authorities were closely cooperating with European security forces, and “of course, also with the authorities in America” (BBC News 3/14/2004). Indeed in military cooperation in the war on terrorism, Germany provides the largest contingent for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan (Federal Republic of Germany 12/20/2005). Germany is participating in both the military fight against terrorism in Afghanistan as well as the reconstruction of the country (Auswärtiges Amt 12/29/2005). Together the United States and

Germany also focus on closer security cooperation between security services (Auswärtiges Amt 3/2006).

The new circumstances of the world—no longer a battle of East-West—means that comprehensive security “implies that internal and external security can no longer be separated” (Auswärtiges Amt 12/29/2006). Germany has been home to international terrorist cells, including the Hamburg cell that was instrumental in coordinating the terrorist attacks of September 11. Germany has used policing and law enforcement to prosecute conspirators. Germany has had problems, however, winning convictions in terrorism cases (Whitlock A12). In one particular case, a German court originally convicted Mounir Motassadeq guilty of 3,000 counts of accessory to murder in the 9/11 attack and convicted him of being a member of the Hamburg cell. An appellate court overturned that conviction. However, upon retrial Motassadeq was found guilty of being a member of a terrorist cell, but not guilty of accessory to murder. The new verdict was praised by Interior Minister Otto Schily saying, “A clear signal has been sent of the determination of the state in the fight against terrorism” (Whitlock A12). However, the cooperation between Germany and the United States in the prosecution of the terrorist is not smooth. The judge in Motassadeq retrial criticized the US government for refusing to allow the court to interview or have access to several captured al Qaeda leaders who he claims could have shed light on the inner workings of the Hamburg cell (Whitlock A12). He also accused the US of not cooperating with requests for information and of being uncooperative during the trial (Whitlock A12).

Germany: Philosophical Understanding

Germany recognizes the threat of international terrorism and calls the fight against terrorism a core task of the Bundeswehr—the German Armed Forces (Federal Republic of

Germany 3/29/2006). The current German government argues that conflict prevention and post-crisis rehabilitation efforts have become at least as important as the ability to take military and police force action in response to threats (Auswärtiges Amt 12/29/2005). This means that military steps are necessary as are security measures such as intelligence and policing, but that conflict prevention—such as diplomacy and bargaining is important, as are rebuilding efforts. This is evidenced in the manner in which Germany is pursuing the fight against terrorism and its foreign policy.

Germany's foreign policy is not centered on the fight against terrorism. Chancellor Merkel wants Germany to assert its credibility at an international level, but she references the role Germany is playing in negotiations with Iran and pushing for deployment of the Bundeswehr in the Congo (Federal Republic of Germany 3/29/2006). These are examples of the lead Germany wants to take in conflict prevention and crisis rehabilitation. While Germany wanted to support its NATO ally who had been attacked, the German public was hesitant to commit to military action; indeed, Schroeder faced an uphill battle in the push to commit troops to Afghanistan (Szabo 17). Germany may recognize the need for military action in dealing with threats, but has a hard time committing to provide it. The German strategy for battling terrorism focuses on policing and intelligence work.

Germany has dealt with terrorism before, when in the 1970s the Red Army Faction (RAF) terrorized Germany.

“The lesson drawn in Germany from its experience was that the threat of terrorism must be taken seriously, but it must be countered with a long-term, incremental strategy relying on extensive police and intelligence work” (Szabo 70).

Schroeder showed his commitment to this policy when he stated, “you do not fight this form of terrorism with laws, but with tough persecution and, provided the attackers are caught, with

severe punishment” after the Madrid bombings (BBC News 3/14/2004). Additionally, the steps Germany has taken to fight terrorism includes joining the EU Heads of State and Governments to agree on stricter security measures in Europe, drying up the financial resources of terrorism as well as new initiatives to create greater security (Auswärtiges Amt 12/29/2006). This is not to say that Germany rejects the option of military steps, as Szabo quotes one German analyst, but instead Germany prefers a “civilian” approach: economic incentives and international cooperation among law enforcement authorities (Szabo 70).

Even the law enforcement aspect of Germany’s fight against terrorism has its limits. The German government, both under Schroeder and now under Merkel question the US’s approach to combating terrorism. Merkel, in a statement released after a meeting with Secretary of State Rice, stated Germany and the United States want to work together to address the threats of the 21st century, but that there is a need to find a balance between “a determined defense against those who would threaten our freedom and a choice of appropriate means of defense that is in keeping with shared democratic principles” (Federal Republic of Germany 12/6/2005). Merkel looked for reassurance from the United States that it respects international treaties and national laws in its fight against terrorism—including the ban on torture (Federal Republic of Germany 12/6/2006). Furthermore, Merkel has raised concerns about the US’s prisons in Guantanamo Bay and has called for its closure (Facts on File: 1/19/2006). The German public supports Germany’s independent approach in combating the war on terror. In fact, 50 percent of Germans oppose US-led efforts to fight terrorism, according to the 2006 Pew Global Attitudes Project.

Germany: Respect

Germany continues to question the United States when it comes to consideration.

Germans perceive the US favors acting unilaterally. A German government website describing the transatlantic relationship states,

“Since the founding of the Federal Republic, multilateralism has been a fundamental component of German foreign policy. Due to its different experiences the US has a different initial position on and understanding of this issue. This explains our differences of opinion on issues such as Iraq, the International Criminal Court, the Kyoto Protocol and the Ottawa Convention” (Auswärtiges Amt 12/29/2005).

Furthermore, Germany, as a medium-sized state, realizes that it has to participate in multilateral organizations to make a difference in the world, whereas, the United States has the option and the inclination to “go it alone” (Szabo 72). The feeling that Americans have the inclination to act unilaterally applies to the German public, where only 38 percent of Germans believe the United States takes their country into its foreign policy decisions, which was reported in the 2005 Pew Global Attitudes Project.

Despite the questions raised by Merkel on the way the US is pursuing the fight against terrorism, Merkel states, “We pursue a foreign policy that is in keeping with German interests. It is in Germany’s interest to promote the process of European integration as well as to maintain a close transatlantic partnership”—a partnership based on shared democratic values (Federal Republic of Germany 12/6/2006). How close the United States and Germany work may be limited by the German public—59 percent of whom favor a more independent approach to security and diplomatic affairs, instead of continuing a close relationship with the United States. Additionally, 73 percent of Germans would like to see a country as powerful as the United States emerge. Both findings were reported in the 2005 Pew Global Attitudes Project. Finally, 60 percent of Germans hold unfavorable opinions of the United States, according to the 2006 Pew

Global Attitudes Project. All three of these public opinion findings may put a check on how closely Germany and America will work together in the future.

France: Operational Cooperation

“The US and France continue to cooperate closely on many issues, most notably the global war on terrorism,” according to the US Department of State “Background Note” (7). Indeed, France has reached out to the United States, making a proposal to express immediate solidarity with the US after 9/11 and to proposed to show a military reaction against terrorism, against al Qaeda as chair of the UN Security Council, immediately following 9/11 (Chirac 9/23/2003). The French have been strong supporters of NATO and participate in the ISAF for Afghanistan militarily (US Department of State: France 7). Despite the difficulties that the United States and France experienced over the invasion of Iraq, cooperation between the US and France in the intelligence and law enforcement dimensions of the war on terror “remain excellent” (US Department of State: France 7).

Jacques Chirac claims the United States and France have a strong cooperation in the battle against terrorism (Chirac 6/5/2004). Indeed he says, “we’ve considerably stepped up our collaboration and cooperation in this area, especially in the last two years” (Chirac 6/5/2004). He argues the same cooperation and collaboration applies to the battle against proliferation, which demonstrates “exemplary cooperation” (Chirac 6/5/2004). France monitors and disrupts terrorist groups and has processed US requests for information under the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty. Additionally, according to the US State Department, French security and intelligence services have rounded up hundreds of extremists in the past year (US State Department: France 7). France also is addressing the long-range task of defeating terrorism and

weapons of mass destruction at the United Nations, the G-8 and among Europeans by drawing up more effective instruments within the framework of existing treaties (Chirac 8/27/2004).

France: Philosophical Understanding

Jacques Chirac takes a very strong stand against international terrorism, calling for “all forms of terrorist attack to be condemned” (Chirac 3/4/2006). Chirac claims terrorism is “like a fatal virus that affects certain societies,” which is why he, “associates himself with anything that enables terrorism to be fought successfully” (Chirac 3/4/2006). Regarding the threat in France, French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin claims, “Never has the threat of terrorism been as strong in our country, in Europe and throughout the world” (French Republic 11/17/2005). Prime Minister de Villepin argues the threat of international terrorism is based on a complex organization that combines fundamental preachers based in France, individuals who are often well integrated and speak French and organizers who are skilled in the most recent technologies (French Republic 11/17/2005).

Chirac claims that by virtue of its history and status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, the French are accustomed to acting whenever international peace and security are threatened (Chirac 11/18/2004). In that vein, France has taken domestic measures to combat terrorism and international measures. De Villepin emphasizes the “key role” of intelligence, which lies at the heart of the anti-terrorism system in France (French Republic 11/17/2005). He argues French security services perform “round-the-clock surveillance work on individuals and networks likely to suddenly turn to violence” (French Republic 11/17/2005). Furthermore, the French are in constant contact with the international intelligence community in order to exchange information (French Republic 11/17/2005). French anti-terrorism legislation passed in December, 2005 emphasized surveillance, increasing video surveillance of railways stations,

airports and other public areas, permits official snooping on the Internet and mobile telephone records, and lengthens the period of detention for terrorist suspects” (*Agence France Presse* 12/22/2005). Additionally, officials will have greater authority to conduct identity checks on cross-border trains and local authorities will have the right to ban certain individuals from entering sporting stadiums, among other measures (*Agence France Presse* 12/22/2005). These domestic measures, however, are not enough. Prime Minister de Villepin argues to fight the threat of terrorism effectively, France needs to work with European partners and the international community as a whole with a priority focused on speeding up judiciary and police cooperation in the European Union (French Republic 11/17/2005).

On the international level, Chirac argues battling terrorism means preventing terrorists from operating from States, keeping biological, chemical or nuclear materials out of their hands, keeping terrorists away from exploring modern communication resources and taking advantage of different laws between states (Chirac 1/4/2002). Additionally, financing needs to be shut down and that terrorists cannot find refuge or asylum—“we must hunt them down everywhere” (Chirac 1/4/2002). The work against terrorism must be completed within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with the law (Chirac 3/4/2006). As part of the fight against terrorism at an international level, Chirac supports an open dialogue between cultures to help better understand differences and perceive them in a “spirit of mutual tolerance and openness” (Chirac 3/4/2006). Chirac is a big supporter of Spain’s “Alliance of Civilizations,” an alliance designed to promote dialogue and mutual understanding between different cultures. All of the international actions outlined by de Villepin and Chirac to battle terrorism must not be unilateral, to ensure legitimacy, according to Chirac (1/4/2002). “We must make certain that all agreements on the fight against terrorism, as well as agreements on non-proliferation, are accompanied by a

system of effective international oversight” (Chirac 1/4/2002). Chirac often links terrorism and non-proliferation, and in that sense turns combating terrorism into an effort that must be addressed with diplomacy, policing and security efforts and intelligence work. Like the struggle against proliferation, terrorism cannot be defeated with only or primarily military tactics.

Chirac does not believe the problems in the Middle East can be changed by force (Chirac 7/26/2006). In fact, Chirac argues military operations in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq, has hardened relations between Islam worldwide and the West and has sparked conflict between Shi’a and Sunni Muslims, thereby fostering the development of terrorism (Chirac 7/26/2006). France’s independence from the US-led War on Terror is supported by the French public. 56 percent of the French are opposed to the US-led War on Terror, according to the 2006 Pew Global Attitudes Project.

France: Respect

France argues that terrorism can only be defeated through multilateral efforts. Chirac claims this is in contrast to the United States. “The US has a vision of the world which is very unilateralist. I hold a multilateralist—which apparently—and I say apparently—is opposed to this” (Chirac 5/26/2003). The French public also believe the United States acts unilaterally—the 2005 Pew Global Attitudes Project states only 18% of the French believe the United States takes their country’s interests into consideration in making international policy decisions. 60% of the French hold unfavorable opinions of the United States, as reported in the 2006 Pew Global Attitudes Project.

While the United States is inclined to believe they live in a unipolar world, and would like to see that continue (63% of American prefer the US remains the world’s sole military power according to the 2005 Pew Global Attitudes Project), Chirac believes that Europe is, and

will be in the future a major world power and that we are moving into a multi-polar world (Chirac 5/26/2003). “In any case, there will essentially be two poles: Europe and the US” (Chirac 5/26/2003). 85% of the French would like to see the EU or some other country become as powerful as the US, according to the 2005 Pew Global Attitudes Project. In the same survey 73% of the French would like their government to take a more independent approach to security and diplomatic affairs, instead of working as closely with the United States as it has in the past. While many of these statements and figures are cause for concern, Chirac believes that there is no problem in continuing relations between the United States and France, because we share the same values (Chirac 5/26/2003).

Spain: Operational Cooperation

“Spain and the US are strong allies in the fight against terrorism” according to the US State Department. After the attacks on September 11th, former President Aznar backed military action in Afghanistan and pushed for increased international cooperation on terrorism in the EU. Aznar supported the military invasion of Iraq (US State Department). Aznar aligned himself with British Prime Minister Blair, sending a joint appeal to NATO urging the alliance to shape a new role for itself in the struggle against terrorism (*Agence France Presse* 6/3/2002). In terms of coordinating with the United States on security measures, Aznar went as far as to say, “the coordination of policy with the US...is essential to our own survival” (*The Irish Times* 6/7/2002). Aznar stood solidly beside the United States, saying, “Spain will act in solidarity in the fight against international terrorism, as we wish others will act in solidarity with us” (*BBC* 9/25/2003).

When Zapatero came to power after the Madrid bombings, he spoke on the phone with President Bush and both leaders said they looked forward to working together, “particularly to

fight terrorism” (*Agence France Presse* 3/15/2004). Zapatero told *Time Magazine Europe* that Spain’s firmness in fighting terrorism is as strong as ever (9/27/2004). Indeed Zapatero continued Spain’s participation in coalition efforts in Afghanistan, including maintaining troop support in 2004 and 2005 elections, and has cooperated on counterterrorism issues (US State Department: Spain 3). Furthermore, shortly after his election, Zapatero stated he intended to increase Spain’s military presence in Afghanistan to demonstrate his commitment to the fight against international terrorism (*Agence France Presse* 3/23/2004). The Spanish Interior Ministry reported it would increase the number of security and intelligence personnel in Turkey and the United States, “in order to strengthen cooperation against international terrorism” (*Turkish Daily News* 9/21/2004). Interior Minister Alonso met with the director of the FBI and agreed that the fight against international terrorism could not be fought alone, so progress was made on cooperational measures at meeting between the two leaders (*BBC* 5/10/2005). The police and Civil Guard in Spain agreed to adopt the DNA analysis system Codis, used in the US, and the two nations discussed developing systems regarding the detection of explosives and other dangerous materials capable of being used by terrorists, and the possibility of improving checks on and monitoring of terrorism funding (*BBC* 5/10/2005).

Spain: Philosophical Understanding

Spain, because it has been dealing with terrorism from the ETA, recognized the threat of international terrorism and in 2000 supported drafting an international convention on international terrorism (*Xinhua General News Service* 9/14/2000). Spain took over the agenda-setting EU presidency for six months following the attacks of September 11 and set the issue of international terrorism as a top priority (*Teyssou* 1/2/2002). Indeed, Spain’s foreign minister at the time, Josep Pique, said, “How can we in all seriousness talk about security and defense

policy in Europe without looking at terrorism as one of the major threats?” (*Black et al* 2/2/2002). International terrorism and illegal immigration topped Prime Minister Aznar’s list of the greatest problems confronting the EU (*The Irish Times* 6/7/2002). Aznar even said he regretted that,

“Despite all the terrorist attacks and all the pain and all the destabilization that terrorist attacks cause...there are still people who don’t really grasp the threat and the danger that lie in store for the world and for our democracies, which we are prepared and determined to combat, get rid of and defeat” (BBC News 11/24/2003)

When Zapatero assumed power, he too recognized terrorism as a threat. As he assumed power, *The Irish Times* stated he was focusing almost as much on his domestic agenda, as he was on international terrorism and foreign affairs (3/18/2004). “The absolute priority remains the struggle against terrorism” (*Agence France Presse* 3/21/2004). Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos said that the United States and Spain had to work together and united to fight terrorism (*BBC* 6/4/2004).

Spain: Philosophical Understanding

Spain under Aznar looked to fight international terrorism through multilateral security, policing and intelligence efforts and through military action. He supported, along with Tony Blair, creating a military mission for NATO with the purpose of battling terrorism. He linked Iraq to international terrorism (*Agence France Presse* 9/10/2002). He supported creating a general convention on international terrorism in 2000. As the President of the EU following the September 11 attacks, Spain pressed the EU to formally incorporate the war against international terrorism into its security and defense policy, which would require member states to pool intelligence resources in an unprecedented way (*Black et al* 2/2/2002). Civilian security services already collaborated closely on terrorism, but Spain’s proposal was much broader, under which

the EU would share its military know-how and coordinate the response of member states to the threat of chemical, nuclear or biological attacks by international terrorists (*Black et al 2/2/2002*).

When Zapatero assumed power, he rejected the Iraq component of the fight against terrorism, but continued Spain's multilateral intelligence/policing security approach to combating terrorism. Both Germany and France called to congratulate Zapatero and stated their governments would share many goals including the fight against terrorism (*Agence France Presse 3/15/2004*). Zapatero, when he came into office, called for improved cooperation between intelligence services in Europe (*Agence France Presse 3/21/2004*). He has pursued this at the EU level and at the G5 level, when in 2006, the countries decided to make available to their respective crime-fighting forces deemed useful to help fight organized crime in general (*Agence France Presse 3/15/2006*). Information that will be immediately available to countries will be fabrication of false identify papers, stolen cars, digital fingerprint databases and results of DNA tests (*Agence France Presse 3/15/2006*). Interior Minister Alonso believed that by exchanging information between EU police forces, it would show the EU's determination to act decisively against the threat of terrorism (*Agence France Presse 3/15/2006*). Zapatero's final multilateral approach to combating terrorism is his "Alliance of Civilizations." It is a bid to bring Western and Muslim countries together to overcome mutual misunderstandings and promote dialogue between the two (*AFX 8/2/2005*). Spaniards support this independent approach to the fight against terrorism, as 76 percent of them oppose the US-led War on Terrorism (2006 Pew Global Attitudes Project)

Domestically, near the end of 2004, Spain increased funding for the CNI National Intelligence Center by 17 percent to allow Spain's secret services to increase personnel and material costs to "adapt to the need to combat this century's new risks and threats" (*BBC News*

9/29/2004). In addition, Interior Minister Alonso assigned three hundred new agents annual in Spain to fight international terrorism, leading to 1,200 additional agents in four years to fight terrorism (AFX 11/21/2004). Beyond these domestic security efforts, Zapatero stressed that “the final and indispensable instrument” in combating terrorism is the “unity of citizens, political parties, social organizations and institutions” (*Xinhua General News Service* 12/14/2004).

Spain: Respect

Zapatero argued that, “France, Germany and Spain have a less unitary view of the world [than the US]. We have a conception that we need a world of civilization and understanding (*Time Magazine Europe* 9/27/2004). The Spanish public follows this thinking, as the 2005 Pew Global Attitudes Project reported only 19 percent of Spaniards believed the United States took their country’s interests into consideration in its foreign policy decisions. 69 percent of Spaniards would prefer to have a multipolar world as compared to a world where the US is the sole military power (Pew Global Attitudes Project 2005).

Defense Minister Jose Bono stressed that “security cannot be built in the world without the essential contribution of the USA” (*BBC* 5/3/2005). He argued that for Spain, “it is vital to maintain an excellent relationship with North America” (*BBC* 5/3/2005). Zapatero says Spain is a friend of the United States (*Time Magazine Europe* 9/27/2004). However, 50 percent of Spaniards favor a more independent approach to security and diplomatic affairs, as opposed to the 43 percent who favor continuing a close relationship with the United States, according to the 2005 Pew Global Attitudes Project. 73% of Spaniards had an unfavorable opinion of the United States in 2006 (Pew Global Attitudes Project).

Analysis

The state of the security aspect of the transatlantic alliance can be measured by laying out the operational, philosophy and respect categories on a table and seeing how the countries compare. The operational coordination between the United States and the European countries selected is not perfect, but is fully functional. The United States needs European help in combating terrorism through some military participation, but more importantly in sharing intelligence, working bilaterally and multilaterally to thwart terrorist attempts, find terrorists and would-be terrorists and prosecute these persons. Despite some problems with the manner in which the United States has acted—being a bully, being disrespectful or being uncooperative--the operational coordination continues between all European countries and the United States.

The philosophical category is where the United States and Europe trend apart. The United States and Britain both believe we are engaged in a battle of arms and ideas and see themselves as fulfilling an almost messianic mission by defeating terrorism and replacing extremism with democracy. Germany, France and Spain all view terrorism as a major threat to the world, but do not see the struggle against it in the same era-defining terms as the US and the UK. This difference also applies to the method the countries employ to defeat terrorism. The US and the UK favor military intervention and a push to spread democracy and to bring the fight to the terrorists in addition to policing and intelligence measures. Germany, France and Spain, while supportive of democratic movements, prefer to fight terrorism through intelligence sharing, surveillance, policing methods, and tough prosecution under the law. That is not to say that the United States and the United Kingdom do not fight terrorism using the same methods, only that the continental European countries studied do not follow the fight against terrorism to the next step, like the US and the UK do. Additionally, on the continent, there is widespread

opposition to the US-led “War on Terrorism.” There is a small difference in the manner in which the US and the UK use surveillance methods, the US favoring a preventive, safety approach and the UK preferring a long-term, risk-management approach, but the US and the UK remain philosophically aligned. More Britons support the US-led War on Terror than those who oppose it, and support for the “War on Terror” is highest in the UK than in any other country studied.

The respect category is the weakest category in the security alliance. While Americans favor closer ties with Europe and President Bush calls for a new era of transatlantic unity, the Europeans are not buying the message. Of the four European countries studied, three countries had unfavorable opinions of the United States and all four stated they did not feel the United States took into account the interests of their respective countries when the US made foreign policy decisions. All four countries also wanted to see another power in the world, be it the EU, China or some other country as powerful as the United States, creating a multipolar world. Moreover, all four European countries favored a more independent approach to diplomatic and security affairs, as opposed to continuing a close relationship with the United States. Three of the governments of the European countries believe the US is unilateral. Each leader, however, stressed the importance of continuing the security relationship between the United States and Europe. However the trends of public opinion may put a check on how closely the two sides of the Atlantic will continue to work together, and perhaps already has.

The United States and Europe are working well together operationally, but philosophically they are divided and there is little respect for US power and the US on the European side of the Atlantic in popular opinion. In the present day, according to my measurement, the security aspect of the transatlantic relationship works at a nuts and bolts level,

but is shifting towards independence at a philosophical level, and there is little respect. I would argue that this is shaky at best. If the security facet of the transatlantic relationship is shaky, this may or may not be detrimental to the transatlantic relationship. There is a need for further research.

The research conducted here is meant to be a starting point for further investigation. It is difficult to go in-depth to assess how the operational cooperation is working between the United States and its European allies, for example, because much of the work is clandestine. Furthermore, the other aspects of the security alliance should be measured, such as dealing with rogue states, the Middle East and nuclear non-proliferation to see whether there is operational coordination, philosophical alignment and respect in those other issues. It may be the case that the transatlantic partners have differences on other security issues as well, which is further damaging the security facet of the transatlantic relationship. However, the perceived threats from rogue states, the Middle East, and nuclear proliferation can differ from country to country and that may explain a difference in level of cooperation, and approach to solving the problem. Terrorism poses the same threat to Americans as it does to Europeans and has affected Europeans as much as Americans. Due to the similarity in the perception of the threat, this paper focuses on the global war on terror because it is an excellent tool to view the workings of the transatlantic relationship. Defeating international terrorism is a battle that requires cooperation between allies and is a priority for both sides of the Atlantic. If the global war on terrorism is splitting these traditional allies apart, then there is a problem within the security facet of the transatlantic relationship.

Broader Conclusions

More broadly, the economic aspect of the transatlantic relationship needs to be evaluated as does the shared values aspect. In the analysis of the security alliance, I stated that economics and values were constants. That may not be the case. Economics on the surface seems to be strong right now. As outlined in the history of the transatlantic relationship above, there is a considerable amount of trade between the United States and the EU, and there is large direct investment by Europeans in America and by Americans in Europe. It is in the interest of economics that the two partners in the transatlantic alliance keep working together. Economics though can change as Brazil, China and India become global economic players and can shift investors' attentions away from America and the United States. If that were the case, the economic relationship would diminish, hurting the transatlantic alliance. However, that situation is hypothetical and it is difficult to measure the transatlantic relationship based on projections of future economic conditions.

The values aspect of the transatlantic relationship needs to be looked at closely. There seems to be a shift in what it means to be European, with Europeans defining themselves as much as Europeans as they are identifying themselves as not-American (Cox 226). Changes in leadership can also change the prevailing values on either side of the Atlantic. This may or may not be detrimental to the transatlantic alliance. However, currently, I would argue that both sides of the Atlantic hold strong democratic values, and that they still identify with one another more closely than with any other region in the world.

The remaining two aspects of the transatlantic relationship need to be approached as the security alliance was approached in this paper. They need to be reevaluated based on present circumstances. The security alliance is damaged, functional, but damaged, and that is causing

harm to the transatlantic alliance. Reassessing the economic aspect and the values aspect will complement the security evaluation and the true health of the transatlantic relationship can be assessed.

At the heart of it all, the relationship between the United States and Europe needs to be measured in the context of the current global environment. I prescribed a method in which to conduct this evaluation and showed, using that method, the state of the security aspect of the transatlantic relationship. I found there were problems within the security aspect of the transatlantic relationship, and that though it may look different than it has in the past and it may not be as strong, the relationship is still there. It still continues. The security threats of our time necessitate cooperation between all countries of the world that wish to live in peace. The people of the United States want to continue a close relationship with Europe, but in order to accomplish that, the United States has to treat its partners with more respect and with a little humility. Despite the differences between the United States and Europe and the shaky nature of the security alliance, I do not believe those rifts are permanent and I firmly believe the United States and Europe will continue to work together in a new era of transatlantic cooperation.

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